



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

### The Offer of Mediation.

On the 10th of March Presidents Kruger and Stein forwarded to our government, through the United States consul at Pretoria, a request for intervention with a view to the cessation of hostilities. A similar request was made to the European Powers. The two republics had already on the 5th of March cabled to Lord Salisbury a request for peace negotiations, giving a statement of the terms which they would accept, namely, incontestable independence and amnesty for the Cape Colony Dutch who had fought with the Boers. To this Lord Salisbury, on the 11th of March, replied that the British government was "not prepared to assent to the independence either of the South African Republic or of the Orange Free State."

Secretary Hay, on receiving the request of the two republics, sent a friendly note communicating it to the British government, and stating that the President "expresses his earnest hope that a way to bring about peace may be found, and that he will be glad to aid in any friendly manner to promote so happy a result." To this Lord Salisbury replied that the British government, while thanking the President for his friendly interest, "cannot accept the intervention of any other power." In the House of Commons Mr. Balfour made the same statement, which was vociferously cheered.

This probably ends for the present all hope of mediation. There is no prospect that intervention in any other form will be undertaken by the powers, singly or in unison, for this would mean war on a much larger scale. The war, therefore, is to be fought out to the bitter end, as the presidents of the two republics have declared that the struggle will not be given up until independence is obtained or the Boers are crushed out.

The British government's course at this stage of the operations needs little comment. It is of a piece with what has been done at every step from the time of the Jameson raid. The mask is now off. The open declaration has been officially made that the independence of the two republics is to be ruthlessly extinguished. Multitudes of people in England and elsewhere agree with Sir Wilfred Lawson's declaration in the House of Commons that this course will be "a cowardly and infamous transaction." The Transvaal republic has been willing from the first to submit all the questions of difference to arbitration. But every plea for such reference has been rejected, and now the English government has closed the door finally to everything but a continuation of the drama of blood.

This offer of mediation gave Great Britain a chance to secure without further bloodshed and with honor before the world all the reforms in the Transvaal's methods of treating foreigners that could reasonably

be asked. She would also without doubt have retained by this method the relations hitherto existing between herself and the two republics. This course would likewise have resulted in the restoration of a fair amount of racial good-feeling, — a thing which she has henceforth rendered impossible. By refusing the offer of mediation and at the same time publishing her intention to destroy their independence, England has crawled out from under cover and haughtily and daringly disclosed her true purpose toward the South African countries. So henceforth shall she be judged.

Not less selfish and contemptuous is her attitude toward the rest of the civilized world. The refusal of mediation is a declaration that the war and the interests involved in it are nobody's business but her own. She thereby puts herself in spirit outside of the community of nations, assuming herself to have a right to proceed as she pleases without regard to the rights, interests or humane dispositions of others. Such conduct is a renunciation of one of the most vital principles of civilization. The policies and doings of one nation to-day, as a part of a great world-system, affect deeply the interests of every other. In a question, therefore, like that of the South African republics, as in others involving essential elements of the common humanity, every nation has the right not only to utter its voice in a clear and impartial way, but to be heard. No nation any longer is excusable for closing its ears to the request for a hearing on a question of universal concern. Much less a nation like England, who has so often insisted on the right to be heard in the international affairs of others. Armies and navies however great, wealth however immense, cannot prevent the ultimate fatal consequences of such overweening self-dependence and thrusting aside of others. It is perilous in any case to have the hatred and distrust of all other nations, and doubly so when headstrong wrong-doing is the cause.

The offer of mediation has for the moment proved fruitless. But its moral effects will be great and lasting. It came in response to an extraordinary public demand — a joint appeal from great masses of men and women not in America only, but also in Europe. It is an expression, therefore, of the growing abhorrence of war among civilized peoples. The action of our government will greatly fortify and encourage the numerous individuals and associations which are working for international peace and co-operation. Such will be its effect also upon those in Great Britain who are struggling so heroically to bring the war to an end; and the English government will find it less easy, in spite of loud protestations to the contrary, to pursue to the end a heartless and barbarous policy towards the little South African republics.

This action of our government also virtually establishes the principle of mediation in practice upon the

new basis proposed by the Hague Convention. Though the Convention has not yet gone into effect, the offer was made in harmony with the principle enunciated in its third article. While the offer of mediation, therefore, is a tacit recognition that the two republics are entitled to be considered as having a certain international standing, yet it cannot justly be considered by England as in any sense an unfriendly act. Though it has awakened some criticism on the part of the British war-public, it has generally been accepted in the friendly spirit in which it was made.

In this sense, our government's action is of the very highest importance. Mediation on this new plane will probably, through the force of this one act, remain as a permanent feature of international law, whether the Hague Convention is ratified or not. The change of tone which will thereby be brought about in international relations, in the course of years, must necessarily prove a powerful factor in allaying irritation and suppressing the spirit of belligerency. The effect even in the final settlement of the South African questions may be much more marked than present indications would lead us to expect.

It is possible that this offer of mediation may be the means of saving the Hague Convention and securing its final adoption. There has been some fear that, though our Senate has already ratified it, the uncertainty of present international conditions may finally cause it to lapse. Under these circumstances, our government's action in proposing mediation in accordance with the provisions of the convention, must give strong support to it as a whole, and may prove the determining factor in inducing the governments represented at The Hague to set the seal of their approval on the great work accomplished by their representatives in the Peace Conference.

### **Treat the Philippines as We Treat Cuba.**

In his speech in the Senate on the 7th of March, Senator Lodge used the following words: "Another proposition is that we should treat the Philippines as we treat Cuba. That is precisely what we are doing. But what is really meant by this demand is not that we treat the Philippines as we treat Cuba, but that we should make to them a promise as to the future."

It is incomprehensible that a man of Mr. Lodge's intelligence should have uttered these sentences on the floor of the Senate, and then allowed them to stand unchanged, as he has, in the revised form of his speech. His memory must have been badly dozing at both times.

There is scarcely a shadow of resemblance between the ways in which we have treated Cuba and the Philippines. Before the war with Spain we made a solemn pledge to Cuba by joint resolution of Congress against forcible annexation. We have made

no such pledge to the Philippines either before or during or since the war. In the treaty of peace we required Spain to *renounce sovereignty over Cuba*, and we went no further. In the case of the Philippines, in the same treaty we required her to *cede* them to the United States. Because of this action, suspected by them early in the negotiations, the Filipinos were angered into attempting to maintain by arms against us the liberty which they desired and believed themselves entitled to. The treatment of the Cubans rendered them peaceful, thankful and confiding. The Filipinos have been fighting us ever since. We have gradually withdrawn our troops from Cuba; we are still maintaining an army of sixty thousand men in the Philippines, and are daily killing numbers of the inhabitants.

Since the war with Spain, we have made and reiterated time and again to Cuba "a promise as to the future." In the most solemn way, we have told her that we mean to keep our Congressional pledge to her, and that she shall ultimately have her independence if she wishes it. This has been done by the President in his message, by the governor-general in person, and, since Mr. Lodge made his seventh-of-March speech, by Secretary Root in the most formal and unequivocal way. We have made no such promise to the Filipinos. They have asked for it, but in every case we have refused them. We have, on the contrary, told them in the plainest terms that their territory is a part of our domain, and that we mean to hold it forever. The President has said this in messages and speeches; the Philippine Commission has said it; the Senate has said it in its formal ratification of the peace treaty; the press has said it; Senator Lodge, Senator Beveridge, and the whole anti-Filipino junta have said it.

It is true, we have not told the Cubans at what time in the future they shall have their independence, and in this respect only we have not made to them "a promise as to the future." But what resemblance is there between this and the refusal to give the Filipinos the faintest assurance that they shall ever have independence, or rather the open declaration to them and to the world that they shall never have it, but shall remain forever under the sovereignty of the United States? We fail to see any, and we doubt if Mr. Lodge, on second thought, would persist in his contention that there is any. The methods of treatment of the two peoples have been diametrically opposite in every essential point.

However, this passage in Senator Lodge's speech is valuable in one particular; it is a public confession that we ought to treat the Philippines as we have been treating Cuba. But that was not his purpose in uttering it. If the passage has any sense at all, and any appropriateness in the speech, it can only mean one thing. It was merely a covert way of saying that all of our resolutions, declarations and